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ABSTRACT
Tabassum, Ummey Hanney. M.A. International and Comparative Politics
Graduate Program, School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State University,
2018. Abandoned by Home and Burden of Host: Evaluating States’ Economic Ability
and Refugee Acceptance through Panel Data Analysis.

This research examines the relationship between the number of refugees
hosted by states and the economic ability of host states by using UNHCR’s refugee
data and World Bank’s GNI per capita data. To identify the relationship between these
two variables, this study uses two sets of panel data covering 145-178 countries,
around 43-55 years and 3000-5000 observations. For the two sets of panel data, four
models are produced to test the null and alternative hypotheses. In all four cases,
results show that there is a statistically significant negative correlation between the
number of refugees hosted by states and GNI per capita of host states. Thus, this study
concludes that across time, when GNI per capita or economic ability increases most
countries tend to receive a fewer number of refugees regardless of their economic
statuses, such as high-income, upper middle income, lower middle income, and lowincome.
Keywords: Panel data analysis; Refugee studies; Cross-sectional and Time
series data; UNHCR; World Bank; GNI per capita; Fixed effects modeling; Random effects
modeling; CEPII data; Population density; Weighted distance
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UNFOLDING GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE HISTORICAL
FEUD BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH OVER HOSTING
REFUGEES
According to the Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2017 report, right now one
in every 110 people is either a refugee, an internally displaced person (IDP) or an
asylum seeker. The report highlights that 68.5 million people are forcibly displaced
from their home countries by the end of 2017, which is the highest in recent history.
To illustrate the severity of the rise in the forcibly displaced population, 16.2 million
people were newly displaced during just the year 2017. However, the record is not an
unexpected event. Instead, the number of forcibly displaced people has been steadily
increasing over time. In 2007, this population was 42.7 million, meaning an increase
of over 50% in the last decade alone (UNHCR, 2017b).
Meanwhile, within these 68.5 million forcibly displaced people, 25.4 million are
refugees, consisting of 19.9 million registered under the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s mandate and 5.4 million Palestinian refugees
under the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)
(UNHCR, 2017b). Naturally, a question arises that who or which countries host this
huge number of refugees. Keeping the welfare of these unfortunate population in
1

mind, one may expect that wealthy or high-income countries are the ones who host
the most number of refugees because “it is generally understood that countries with
strong economies are more likely to be capable of absorbing refugees” (ChartsBin,
2008). In reality, that hardly appears to be the case, because, in contrast to “the
widespread perception that industrialized countries are hosting the bulk of the
world's refugees, the available statistical evidence demonstrates that most refugees
remain in their region of origin and flee to neighboring countries” (ChartsBin, 2008).
Overall, UNHCR (2017) reported a staggering 85% of the refugees under UNCHR’s
mandate are being hosted in the developing regions, with the Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) hosting one-third of this population. Right now, the top five hosts of
refugees are Turkey with 3.5 million, Pakistan with 1.4 million, Uganda with 1.4
million, Lebanon with 0.998 million, and the Islamic Republic of Iran with 0.979
million (UNHCR, 2017b, p. 2). Based on country classification (See Appendix I) by the
World Bank, none of these countries can be considered as developed nations (UN,
2012). Among the five top hosts, only Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran are
considered as upper-middle-income (UMI) countries, and the rest are lower-middleincome (LMI) and low-income countries (See Appendix II) (UN, 2012). Viewing the
report, it appears that the refugees are a “Third World Problem” or “Developing
Countries’ Problem,” (Malkki, 1995); however, that was not always the case.
Historically, the first and second massive refugee crises emerged during and
after World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) in Europe. The First World War
created more than nine million refugees, who were resettled within a few years after
2

the end of the war (Cronin, 2003, p. 156); whereas during WWII, 30 million people
were displaced, and after the WWII, 11 million people had remained displaced and
required post-war assistance (Table 1). Though most of these post-war refugees were
resettled within a few months after the war, there were still many refugees left who
needed assistance, such as, supporters of the Nazi and Fascist governments,
Yugoslavian Croats, and two million Soviet citizens (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989,
pp. 21-22). Vernant (1953) classifies these refugees based on nationality and with
respect to WWII, the categorization is shown in Table 1.
Pre-War Refugees
Russians, Armenians,
Spaniards, Victims of the Nazi
and Fascist regimes

Post-War Refugees
Jews, Albanians, Balts, Bulgarians,
Unaccompanied Children, Poles, Hungarians,
Czechoslovaks, Rumanians, Soviet citizens,
Yugoslavs, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Chinese,
The Venezia Giulians, Refugees of German origin

Table 1: Categories of Refugees according to Vernant (Vernant, 1953, pp. 54-105)
The very first point to note in Table 1 is the impact of WWII on the composition
of refugees. Second, most of the refugees, whether pre-WWII or post-WWII, were
from Europe, which is at present a hub of developed countries; illustrating that the
refugees were not always a “Third World Problem.”
Primarily, the refugee crisis emerged in the Third World in the 1960s during
the rapid decolonization period (Chimni, 1998, p. 358). As Skran (1995) articulates
“when multi-ethnic empires have been transformed into homogeneous nation-states,
mass refugee movements have been an unfortunate by-product” (Chimni, 1998, p.
3

358). Since it was a byproduct of decolonization as well as conflict initiated by the
colonizers, some scholars blame the developed countries for the refugee crisis in the
Third World.
The overwhelming majority of the refugees originate in the Third
World. The direct causes of their flight are conflicts kept alive mostly by superpower politics and by weapons forged and manufactured at bargain prices in
the rich countries, who export death and destruction, and import the natural
and partly processed products of the poor countries. Nobel (116:29) (Malkki,
1995, p. 504)
Figure 1 unfolds the increasing number of global refugees that emerged since
the decolonization period (The Refugee Project, 2018a). It also displays a growing
trend of refugees over the last 56 years. Even though there were some periods when
the number decreased, as a whole, it still demonstrates how the refugee problem has
grown after the decolonization period.

Total World Refugees
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16000000
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12000000
10000000
8000000
6000000
4000000
2000000
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1950
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Figure 1: Growing Trend of World’s Refugees from 1962- 2016 (Data Source:
The Refugee Project, 2018a)
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During the decolonization period refugee problem grew in the South,
subsequently, the North began to display unwillingness to accept refugees in their
territory which pointed out by Betts and Loescher (2011) “movements between
Africa and Europe, and Latin America and North America, overburdened and
fundamentally changed the asylum policies of the North, leading to an emerging set
of restrictive practices and border control measures” (p. 9). The restrictive policies of
the North resulted in an overcrowded refugee burden in the South.
As the gap grows between the North and the South, the idea of the distribution
of refugees in accordance with the wealth and the population density of asylum
country was circulating in the late 1970s (Suhrke, 1998). Known as the global sharing
of refugees, the goal of this idea was “to assign refugees worldwide by matching
refugee preferences with host countries ranked according to an index of wealth and
population density” (Suhrke, 1998, p. 397). Another similar proposal developed in
the early 1990s which urged to “reformulate international refugee law so as to
develop a global system of responsibility-sharing for refugees” (Suhrke, 1998, p. 397).
The focus of both concepts was to reduce inequalities of refugee sharing among
refugee recipient states through collective action (Suhrke, 1998). The problem of
refugee sharing is also addressed and discussed in international organizations, which
resulted in refugee quota in developed countries (Suhrke, 1998, p. 397).
Therefore, the bizarre feud between the North and the South over who host
refugees is based on the economic ability and the North’s role in refugee formation.
Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo (1989) argue that the North has a moral obligation to share
5

the burden of the refugees along with the South since the North has more economic
ability than the South. They note that the North has “enormous resource capabilities
relative to those of the South and on the transnational dynamics of social conflict in
the contemporary world, which at least to some degree makes the North
coresponsible for the upheavals in the South” (p.279).
Consequently, a fundamental argument of the refugee problem within the
international community is hosting refugees. More importantly, the South complains
that the North is not accommodating enough refugees, even though the North can
host more refugees than the South. For both the North and the South, economic factor
remains a major issue that decides who would host refugees, albeit in different ways.
Hence, the purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between the
economic ability of states and the number of refugees they host, through using large
data and applying statistical analysis.
This study is important due to the following reasons. Even though refugee
problem occupies substantial international attention, International Relations (IR) has
not developed enough theories around it.
The discipline of IR has expanded its empirical focus beyond analyzing
war and peace and issues relating to state and military security to address a
range of areas such as the global economy, environment, human rights, and
international trade. However, it has paid comparatively little attention to the
international politics of forced migration. Despite a strong tradition of looking
at refugees within international political history, most work on refugees in
world politics has been based on archival research and has not drawn fully
upon the concepts offered by IR. Where conceptual and theoretical work has
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emerged, it has been in relatively isolated pockets, often marginalized from
the mainstream of IR. (Betts & Loescher, 2011, p. 3)
Thus, this study will contribute to some IR perspectives. Moreover, another
concern related to refugee studies is that host states do not receive much attention
from scholars. Robert Chambers (1986) points out that refugee studies are largely
limited within refugee-related issues, rather than corresponding relations with host
countries or communities. He states, “refugee related research and writing almost
always start and end with refugees, with hosts either not considered or treated as
secondary or incidental” (Chambers, 1986, p. 246) and he calls it refugee-centrism
(Chambers, 1986). As this study is focusing on host related issues, it is leaving the
traditional refugee centric mentality, and the study is essentially focusing on an
overlooked issue within refugee studies.
Lastly, there has not been any large data statistical analysis to see the causal
relationship between the economic ability of the host countries and the number of
refugees accommodated by the countries. There is a similar study done by Betts
(2003), in which he studies burden sharing of refugees among 15 European Union
(EU) member states. Betts examines whether Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is
correlated with the asylum provision of EU member states. He tested the hypothesis
“there is a positive and significant correlation between GDP and asylum provision as
a proportion of GDP amongst the 15 EU member states” by using Spearman rank
correlation test (Betts, 2003: 280). His model includes the GDP of 15 EU member
between 1993 – 1998 and analyzes GDP rank and asylum provision rank of them. He
found that “the rank correlation is not significantly different from zero for all sample
7

years with the exception of 1994” (Betts, 2003: 284). Thus, he rejected the hypothesis
for all those years at the 0.05 significant level.
This study follows the following research process. Chapter 2 captures a broad
spectrum of perspectives within the complex refugee framework because a lot of
refugee-related arguments are centralized within the definition of refugee,
international refugee law, refugee protection, and the international refugee regime.
This chapter creates a base of this research by conceptualizing those aspects
associated with refugees. It also discusses how countries refuse to host refugees.
Chapter 3 begins with the theories regarding the importance of states’ involvement
in refugee protection. It then covers different factors that influence host countries
attitudes towards hosting refugees. In Chapter 4, various aspects of refugee hosting
based on economic ability are discussed. Chapter 5 is all about hypothesis, dependent
variable, independent variable, control variables, data, and methodology. Chapter 6
offers the results and analyses. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the previous chapters
and offers few future recommendations for this research.
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CORE CONCEPTS /CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The Inception of the International Refugee Regime
WWI and WWII shaped the international refugee regime (Zolberg, Suhrke, &
Aguayo, 1989; Betts, 2009). International refugee regime refers to the body of law
that outlines, oversees and regulates the rights, responsibilities, duties, and
obligations of refugee-related issues such as the behavior of refugee-sending and
refugee-receiving states as well as refugee protection (Triola, 2014; Betts, 2009, p. 9).
The notion of creating a refugee regime came from a dual concern: (1) restoring
international order after WWII, and (2) bringing justice to all the refugees. To restore
the international order after the Second World War, Europe needed to ensure
protection and reintegration of the European refugees to create a stable Europe.
Similarly, ensuring justice at an individual level and providing human rights to the
WWII refugees were the second reason to create the international refugee regime
(Betts, 2009, p. 9). Another inclusive reason for creating the international refugee
regime was that consulting states believed that a refugee regime “would ensure that
all states made a collective contribution to overcoming a common problem” (Betts,
2009, p. 9).

9

A short history behind the creation of the international refugee regime is that
after WWI, Europe dealt with post-war refugee crisis on an ad hoc basis. During
WWII, Europe adopted a similar ad hoc approach in supporting refugees. In the early
stage of WWII, the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK)
established the “relief and refugee” administration in the Middle East. Later in 1943,
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), mainly
sponsored by the US government, was established “to oversee most of the immediate
relief and repatriation operations in postwar Europe. But its scope did not extend to
the longer-term needs of those who could not be returned, and the agency was soon
caught up in nascent Cold War tensions” (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, p. 22).
Then again by the end of 1946, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was
created to handle the last one million unsettled refugees by 1951, and after finishing
the task, IRO was abolished. As a replacement of the IRO, UNHCR was created by the
General Assembly (GA) in December 1949 with a mandate of three-year period
(Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, pp. 22, 23). Later, on December 14th, 1950, it
became a permanent subsidiary agency of the UN when the GA adopted the UNHCR
Statute (Feller, 2001, p. 584). The primary responsibility of the UNHCR Statute is to
supervise the implementation of the 1951 Convention (Betts, 2009, p. 10).
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which laid out the roles and
responsibilities of UNHCR, was signed on July 25th, 1951 (Vernant, 1953). Article 35
of the 1951 Convention has defined UNHCR’s roles in the international community.
The core responsibilities of UNHCR are10

To make reports to the competent organs of the United Nations, the
Contracting States undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with
information and statistical data
requested concerning:
(a) The condition of refugees,
(b) The implementation of this Convention, and;
(c) Laws, regulations, and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force
relating to refugees (Article 35) (UNHCR, 2010, p. 31)
Betts interprets that the UNHCR mandate is a combination of two concepts:
“(1) to ensure refugees’ access to their rights while in exile and (2) to ensure refugees’
timely access to durable solutions (Loescher, Betts, and Milner 2008)” (Betts, 2009,
p. 10).
Currently, UNHCR is the main international organization that is responsible
for handling, assisting and protecting refugees throughout the world, except for the
Palestinian refugees (Loescher, 1993, p. 4; Betts, 2009, pp. 9-10). Until 1967, UNHCR
was resettling and protecting refugees displaced due to WWII, which means it mostly
concentrated its work in Europe. At the height of decolonization and the Cold War, by
the end of the 1960s, UNHCR expanded its work in the developing nations by
providing legal advice and capacity building to protect refugees. Throughout the
1980s, UNHCR shifted its work towards the South and focused on the South-to-North
asylum movement, running temporary refugee camps and determining refugee status
in the South (Betts, 2009). During the 1990s, UNHCR went through a massive
expansion. As a result, it increased its operation by “providing humanitarian
assistance to people fleeing the new wars in the former Yugoslavia and sub-Saharan
Africa, focusing increasingly on its care and maintenance role, expanding its
11

involvement in repatriation operations, and even engaging in the protection of IDPs”
(Betts, 2009, pp. 10-11). By the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, UNHCR started
facing institutional competition from different international organizations as well as
informal networks such as the International Migration Organization (IOM) and
Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration (IGC). To combat the institutional
competition, UNHCR strategy moved towards Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and
irregular migrants along with refugees (Betts, 2009, p. 11).
Critics argue that “the gradual shift from being a mainly legal and nonpolitical
actor between the 1950s and 1970s to a more politicized humanitarian actor since
the 1980s has gradually compromised the moral authority of UNHCR (Goodwin-Gill
2000)” (Betts, 2009, p. 11). In contrast, supporters of UNHCR disagree with that view,
as they believe that the shift of UNHCR work as well as the expansion was necessary
due to its increasing demand and relevance to its work with the states (Betts, 2009,
p. 11). Away from both debates, Betts (2009) suggests that “over time, persuasion
based on moral authority has become ever less viable, and UNHCR has relied ever
more on its ability to appeal to and meet the interests of powerful states to ensure a
commitment to refugee protection (Loescher, Betts, and Milner 2008)” (p. 11).
Nonetheless, UNHCR has very limited power concerning fulfilling its responsibilities
due to its inadequate material power as well as the dependency on the North to fund
its activity (Betts, 2009, p. 10).
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International Refugee law and Protection of Refugees
International refugee law and protection of refugees have derived from the
1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. The document covers three areas:
(1) Refugee Definition, (2) The rights of refugees in asylum country, and (3) States’
responsibility towards refugees (Jastram & Achiron, n.p, p. 10). By signing the
Convention and Protocol states “reaffirm that both treaties are central to the
international refugee protection system” (Jastram & Achiron, n.p, p. 10).
Defining Refugee: A Dilemma
The term ‘refugee’ is controversial as it is surrounded by political opinion and
confronted by legal jargons. In academia, one group of scholars demarcates that
“‘refugee’ is simply a bureaucratic label applied by states for political motives” (Hein,
1993, p. 44) and another group thinks that the ‘refugee’ status is a political form of
immigration; yet another group considers ‘refugee’ as a sociological category (Hein,
1993). From a simple sociological view, “a refugee is someone who has been
compelled to abandon his home” (Vernant, 1953, p. 3). In other words, a refugee is
someone “who is homeless, uprooted; a helpless casualty, diminished in all his
circumstances, the victim of events for which, at least as an individual, he cannot be
held responsible” (Vernant, 1953, p. 3). Hence, for Vernant (1953), a victim of natural
disasters (such as floods and earthquakes), a victim of war and prosecution, a victim
of climate change, and even a victim of economic disadvantage would be considered
as a refugee (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989). Meanwhile, the definition given by
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Vernant provides a nominalist perspective of refugee because for a nominalist,
‘refugee’ is a social construction (Hein, 1993, p. 44). Moreover, Vernant’s definition of
refugee presents a very broad view of refugee status, which has been criticized by
Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo (1989). They argue that the term covers a large number
of oppressed, suppressed and poor people who are the victim of ‘push’ factors of
migration (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, p. 4). Instead, they suggest a narrower
view of refugee, which is “persons whose presence abroad is attributable to a wellfounded fear of violence, as might be established by impartial experts with adequate
information….and the violence is initiated by some recognizable internal agent, such
as the government, and directed against dissenters or a specified target group.”
(Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, p. 33). Thus, their definition of refugee represents
a realist’s view of refugee as per realist “violence, flight, and exile as definitive of the
refugee experience” (Hein, 1993, p. 44). Meanwhile, the argument between realists
and nominalists regarding refugee, as Hein (1993) points out, creates “an uneasy
coexistence within the field of international migration” (p. 44). However, the
disagreement of the definition of refugee is not limited within the field of
international migration, rather, this controversy is unavoidable and perpetuates
international law “because defining refugees for purposes of policy implementation
requires a political choice and an ethical judgment” (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989,
p. 4).
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not provide the
definition of refugee, it only says ““Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
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countries asylum from persecution” Article 14(1) (Jastram & Achiron, n.p), during
WWII the very first time the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugee discussed the
term 'refugee' (Vernant, 1953). Later the GA first addressed the term ‘refugee’ in the
fourth session of autumn of 1949 (Jackson, 1999). The 1951 Refugee Convention
defines the term refugee as follow:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall
apply to any person who:
(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May
1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10
February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the
International Refugee Organization;
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee
Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of
refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of
this section;
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
(UNHCR, 2010)
Many of the terms in the Refugee Convention vary under interpretation, which
is why the term causes controversy on occasions. For example, a refugee is someone
who is “outside the country of his former habitual residence” which implies that
whoever recognizes himself/herself as a refugee, does not have to flee from his/her
country of origin. A person can reside in a different county and then can develop wellfounded fear (Gibney, 2010, pp. 13,14). Suppose a Syrian was in Australia while the
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uprising against Assad government started in 2011, and then he/she was too afraid
to go back to Syria, this type of refugee is defined as refugees sur place (Gibney, 2010).
Another situation can arise when a person is already residing outside of his/her
country of origin, but while staying in the foreign land he/she develops and adopts or
expresses certain political or other views which might be forbidden in his country of
origin and endanger his existence in his country of origin. In that case, the person can
be recognized as a refugee under the notion that he/she has well-founded fear
(Gibney, 2010).
Likewise, the interpretations of ‘well-founded fear’ also create debate.
Essentially the debate is which fear it is referring to subjective fear or objective fear
or both (Gibney, 2010). Meanwhile, the dominant view is that in this sense ‘fear’
means the actual state of mind of the claimant; nevertheless, there has to be “some
objective criteria upon which this (subjective) fear could be based” (Gibney, 2010, p.
14). However, this view is not ubiquitously well received because some people can
express themselves, while some other cannot; thus, the people who cannot express
themselves might end up with no protection (Gibney, 2010). Similarly, the term
persecution is debatable, but “the prospect of the denial of certain rights such as
freedom from torture, the right to life, and liberty of the person, would constitute
persecution” (Gibney, 2010, p. 17).
Apart from those factors, without showing a tie with the five elements of
refugee definition, a. Race, b. Religion c. Nationality, d. Political opinion or, e.
Membership of a particular social group, a person cannot be considered as a refugee
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even if he /she shows well-founded fear and persecution. However, a fundamental
problem with these five elements is their definitions and meaning. To illustrate, there
is no definition of race in the Refugee Convention, but UNHCR Handbook defines race
as such “the term race…has to be understood in its widest sense to include all kinds
of ethnic groups that are referred to as ‘races’ in the common usage” (Gibney, 2010,
p. 18). Even though there is no precise definition of race, the International Covenant
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) defines the term
racial discrimination as follow
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural or any other field of public life. (ICERD, 1965)
ICERD’s racial discrimination provides a background of what racial
discrimination can be; however, the real challenge is measuring racial discrimination
that can show that the claims of the oppressed are correct and can receive refugee
status (Gibney, 2010). Consequently, the notion of nationality in the Refugee
Convention does not refer to citizenship, rather it primarily means an ethnic or
linguistic minority within a specific society (Gibney, 2010, p. 20).
The term “nationality” in this context is not to be understood only as
“citizenship”. It refers also to membership of an ethnic or linguistic group and
may occasionally overlap with the term “race”. Persecution for reasons of
nationality may consist of adverse attitudes and measures directed against a
national (ethnic, linguistic) minority and in certain circumstances the fact of
belonging to such a minority may in itself give rise to well-founded fear of
persecution. (par. 74)
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The co-existence within the boundaries of a State of two or more
national (ethnic, linguistic) groups may create situations of conflict and also
situations of persecution or danger of persecution. It may not always be easy
to distinguish between persecution for reasons of nationality and persecution
for reasons of political opinion when a conflict between national groups is
combined with political movements, particularly where a political movement
is identified with a specific “nationality”. (par. 75)
Whereas in most cases persecution for reason of nationality is feared
by persons belonging to a national minority, there have been many cases in
various continents where a person belonging to a majority group may fear
persecution by a dominant minority. (par. 76) (UNHCR, 1979, p. 13)

Talking about political opinion of a person, Gibney states that “political
dissident who expresses views in opposition to the ruling government… including
opinions on any matter in which state policy is involved” (Gibney, 2010, p. 19) either
through speeches, writing or political behavior.
Another problem with the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention
is that it had not addressed the refugee crisis that emerged in the early 1960s during
the decolonization period. Thus, Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, which
ended geographical and time limits from the Convention, was adopted in 1967
(Jastram & Achiron, n.p). Moreover, refugee definition in the Refugee Convention
does not address the problem of external fear such as aggression from another state.
Hence, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) added the phrase: “‘refugee’ shall also
apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign
domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of
his country of origin or nationality” (OAU, 1969) in the AU Convention Governing
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa in 1969.
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To sum up, the term refugee can be portraited in different ways depending on
who is defining it. Thus, the term will always be controversial. However, the term is
particularly important because whether a person receive refugee status or not
depends on the definition of refugee; and for many asylum seekers it is a question of
life and death (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989), “because refugee status is an
entitlement given to those who qualify for access to certain international legal
protections and resources outside of their home country” (Cronin, 2003, p. 155).
Whether or not the term refugee is defined precisely in the Refugee Convention
“today [it] is the only known phenomenon whereby a sovereign state and a person of
foreign nationality, representing only his or her own person, interact with each other,
to advance their claims for, respectively, sovereignty and protection” (Sicakkan, 2012,
p. 359).
The Rights of the Refugees
The four elements that constitute the rights of refugees are nondiscrimination, non-penalization, non-refoulement and standards of treatment of
refugees (UNHCR, 2010, p. 3). The Convention stipulates that refugees should not be
facing any racial, religious or country of origin discrimination. Additionally, under
international human rights law refugees should not be discriminated based on their
gender, age, disability, or other prohibited ground of discrimination (UNHCR, 2010,
p. 3). The Convention prohibits penalization of refugees for their illegal entry or stay.
Similarly, under the international law, it is prohibited to expel or forcibly return of
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refugees or refoulment of refugees to a place where they might face persecution or
endanger their life and freedom1 (UNHCR, 2010; Jastram & Achiron, n.p).
Furthermore, the principle of non-refoulement is known as a rule of customary
international law which implies “that even States that are not party to the Refugee
Convention must respect the principle of non-refoulement” (Jastram & Achiron, n.p, p.
14). In other words, a state cannot prevent refugees who are seeking protection
because it violates the non-refoulement law (UNHCR, 2015, p. 5). Lastly, refugees are
entitled to receive access to court, employment, primary education, rationing,
housing (Article 21), relief, exemption from reciprocity and travel documents from
the host government. Refugees are also obligated to maintain law and regulation of
the host country (UNHCR, 2015, Article 2).
Role of a Host State
“In international law, while a state has the right to grant asylum, there is no
corresponding right of an individual to be granted asylum” (Melander, 1981, p. 35).
Even though the states are not required to grant asylum, they cannot expel refugees
from their territory even if they think that refugees will disturb national security and
public order (Article 32); and also because of the non-refoulement law (Article 33)
states cannot send back the refugees to their country of origin against their will.
Additionally, states cannot punish or impose penalties on the refugees because of

“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”
Article 33(1). (Jastram & Achiron, n.p, p. 14).
1
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their illegal entrance (Article 31). The Convention confirms that the host states shall
provide rationing (Article 20), housing (Article 21), public education (Article 22),
public relief (Article 23), social security (Article 24) and employment (Chapter III).
The international refugee law also ensures that refugees have the rights to receive
certain facilities from the host states such as administrative assistance (Article 25),
freedom of movement (Article 26), identity papers (Article 27), travel documents
(Article 28), tax exemption (Article 29), permit to assets transfer (Article 30), and
naturalization (Article 34). Furthermore, by signing the Convention, states agree to
work and cooperate with UNHCR (Article 35); and they are also required to adopt
national law that ensures the application of the Convention (UNHCR, 2015; Jastram &
Achiron, n.p). Finally, when a state accedes the 1951 Refugee Convention, it adopts
the following values
•
•
•

•

It demonstrates its commitment to treating refugees in accordance with
internationally recognized legal and humanitarian standards;
It gives refugees a possibility to find safety;
It helps to avoid friction between States over refugee questions. Granting
asylum is a peaceful, humanitarian and legal act rather than a hostile
gesture, and should be understood by the refugee’s country of origin as
such;
It demonstrates its willingness to share the responsibility for protecting
refugees; and it helps UNHCR to mobilize international support for the
protection of refugees (UNHCR, 2015, p. 7)

The main challenge with the international refugee law is that states do not
have any legal obligation towards the refugees in other states. Meanwhile, if states
sign the Refugee Convention, then they have some legal obligation to support the
refugees within their state territory, but they do not have any obligation towards the
refugees in other states. If states do not sign the Convention, then they do not have
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any obligation towards any refugees. This condition creates a vacuum within the
refugee system. In other words, taking responsibility for refugees or supporting
refugees is a burden that nobody wants, but some countries take the burden, and
others do not. Hence, for many countries, especially the North, supporting refugees in
the South is an option, not an obligation (Betts & Loescher, 2011, p. 19).
For this reason, the North only shows interest towards certain refugees when
“the politics of other issue-areas has been crucial for defining the interests that have
shaped the engagement or disengagement of Northern states in the refugee problem
in the Global South” (Betts & Loescher, 2011, p. 19). Additionally, some academics
claim that the 1951 Refugee Convention is very Euro-centric, outdated, and so
inflexible that it does not address current refugee challenges; such as economic
migrants and asylum seekers, “the range of security concerns associated with refugee
movements, the costs to states associated with granting asylum , and the growing
scale and globalization of the problem of forced migrants” (Loescher, Betts, & Milner,
2008, p. 98).

Resolving the Refugee Problem: Three Ways
Ideally, decisions regarding the resolution of any refugee situation
should be made by the refugees themselves. Through international
instruments such as the UN 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
as well as national legislation, refugees are guaranteed the right to remain in
exile while they fear that their lives might be in danger should they return
home. (Collins, 1996, p. 2)
Academics and scholars have agreed that voluntary repatriation, integration
in the country of the first asylum/refuge, and resettlement in a third country are the
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three durable solutions of refugee problem (Melander, 1981, p. 35; Hein, 1993, p. 48;
Collins, 1996, p. 2). Voluntary repatriation means that when refugees willingly want
to go back to their home country without violating the notion of non-refoulement. For
most of the refugees who stay in the country of first asylum, voluntary repatriation is
the only choice even after many years of residing in that country (Hein, 1993, p. 50).
Moreover, most of the time the refugees do not have any voice in the decision of going
back to their home state rather the decision usually taken by the organization and
governments (Collins, 1996). Voluntary repatriation practice became popular in the
early 1980s among the UN agencies, governments and non-governmental
organizations (Collins, 1996). While the practice is very popular, quite a few
researchers point out that this solution lacks research as well as evidence that it is a
durable solution to the refugee problem. For example, Chimni argues “voluntary
repatriation has not been adequately researched and that there are situations and
contexts in which it is far from being the ideal solution” (Chimni, 1998, p. 364). In
contrast, for refugees, returning home is a cost-benefit analysis between desirability
to return home and remain as a refugee (Collins, 1996, p. 32). For the refugees,
decision-making process includes many factors such as security, availability of
employment, food, land, fuel, healthcare, education, and other services. If the benefit
of returning home is higher than staying as a refugee, then voluntary repatriation has
a high possibility (Collins, 1996, p. 32).
Local integration, on the other hand, is the most neglected solutions of the
refugee problem (Jacobsen, 2003). Local integration refers to permanently settling
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refugees into the local community of first asylum country with the condition that the
refugees have granted asylum in that country (Melander, 1981; Jacobsen, 2003;
Goodwin-Gill, 2014). States are not obliged to settle refugees in their territory,
however, local integration happens when even after a long period of time the refugees
are not safe to go back their country of origin and at that time a host government can
consider integrating refugees into the local community without giving them any
permanent residence and citizenship (Jacobsen, 2003). Local integration has three
dimensions, addressed by Alexandra Fielden (2008), “Firstly, it is a legal process,
whereby refugees attain a wider range of rights in the host state. Secondly, it is an
economic process of establishing sustainable livelihoods and a standard of living
comparable to the host community. Thirdly, it is a social and cultural process of
adaptation and acceptance that enables the refugees to contribute to the social life of
the host country and live without fear of discrimination” (p. 1). Local integration is
very different from full integration because full integration means providing
permanent residency, granted asylum including social, economic and civil rights by
the host government (Jacobsen, 2003). Meanwhile, local integration raises security,
economic and environmental concerns, as well as local community’s integration
capability concern; thus, “the success of local integration depends on the cooperation
of host governments, the local community, and the refugees themselves. If such a
program threatens the security and stability of either the local community or the
refugees, it is not an option (Jacobsen, 2003).
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Among the three solutions of the refugee problem, resettlement is the least
adopted solution (Hein, 1993, p. 48). To articulate, Chimni states “Around 50 million
refugees were resettled between 1912 to 1969; however, now resettlement of
refugee is the least desirable and consider only if they have special needs” (Chimni,
1998, p. 364). Resettlement was an integral part of the refugee solution right after
WWII as well as during the Cold War because during those periods the West
advocated resettlement as a durable solution. However, resettlement in the West
declined after the end of Cold War and right now less than one percent refugees are
offered resettlement (Chimni, 1998, pp. 363,364). Ultimately, the declining nature of
resettlement in the West increased the burden of refugees in Third World countries.
Moreover, the chances of resettlement of a refugee do not determine by the time a
refugee has been waiting rather it depends on other factors such as medical and other
needs (McAdam, 2013). At present, the UNHCR decides resettlement of refugees
under the following conditions:
•
•

•
•
•

•
•

“Legal and/or Physical Protection Needs of the refugee in the country of
refuge (this includes a threat of refoulement)
Survivors of Torture and/or Violence, where repatriation or the
conditions of asylum could result in further traumatization and/or
heightened risk, or where appropriate treatment is not available
Medical Needs, in particular life-saving treatment that is unavailable in the
country of refuge
Women and Girls at Risk, who have protection problems particular to their
gender
Family Reunification, when resettlement is the only means to reunite
refugee family members who, owing to refugee flight or displacement, are
separated by borders or entire continents
Children and Adolescents at Risk, where a best interests determination
supports resettlement, and
Lack of Foreseeable Alternative Durable Solutions, which generally is
relevant only when other solutions are not feasible in the foreseeable future,
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when resettlement can be used strategically, and/or when it can open
possibilities for comprehensive solutions.” (Karlsen, 2016)

Meanwhile, resettlement in a third world country is not always successful,
especially in low income countries. In the report Refugee Resettlement in Developing
Countries, Stefan Sperl and Irinel Brădişteanu (2004) discuss the result of a Pilot
Project that took place between 1997-2001. Under the project, 226 refugees from
Africa were resettled in Benin, and Burkina Faso because both countries are
“politically stable, respect the terms of the 1951 Convention and have a generous
asylum policy” (p.4). However, the project had failed because of the lack of
government resources and knowledge, lack of employment opportunities and
financial capabilities (Sperl & Brădişteanu, 2004). Additionally, Loescher (1993)
claims that because of many “wide-ranging economic, social, and political reasons, the
majority of the world’s refugees are not offered permanent asylum or the opportunity
to integrate into local communities by most of the Third World governments. Rather,
they are kept separate and dependent on external assistance provided by the
international community” (pp. 8-9). Thus, resettlement in developed countries is a
durable solution, but developed countries are “increasingly reluctant to provide
resettlement and local integration to refugees” (Betts & Loescher, 2011, p. 18). They
rather prefer “and have instead promoted repatriation as ‘the preferred durable
solution” (Betts & Loescher, 2011, p. 18). Likewise, local integration is not a likeable
solution to the host governments, and it needs many processes to succeed. In contrast,
repatriation occurs when the refugees are willing to return, and the country of origin
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has the resource to support the refugees. Thus, all these solutions depend on many
variables and can be durable and not durable based on different contexts.

Strategies Used by the States to Prevent Refugees
Asylum States’ Restriction by Using the Definition of Refugee
As noted earlier in Chapter 2, that refugee status determined by the definition
of ‘refugee’ in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. However,
countries tend to manipulate the interpretation and use this as a prevention
technique to restrict refugees from asylum; “as refugee crises multiply, governments
are tending to interpret the criteria in a narrow sense” (Grahl-Madsen, 1982, p. 69).
To illustrate, Swedish Aliens Act (Utldnningslag) 1980 offers that the term
‘persecution’ would only be effective if the ‘persecution’ “threatens a person's life or
freedom or which otherwise is of a serious nature” (Grahl-Madsen, 1982, p. 69).
Not Signing the 1951 Refugee Convention
A major question raised during the Syrian refugee crisis was ‘why the major
gulf countries or the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members:
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, are not
taking refugees?’ (Fantz, Anderson, & Elwazer, 2015; Kinninmont, 2015; Khazaal,
2015). To answer this question, analysts point out that these countries have not
signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, as a consequence, they do not recognize refugee
status; as a result, “they are not bound by law to provide these people with the
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standard treatment and rights typically afforded those seeking refuge in a new
country” (Khazaal, 2015). Since they opted out from the international refugee law, in
GCC countries, refugees are not entitled to receive any rights and facilities that are
proclaimed by the Refugee Convention. However, it is not true that these countries
have not received any refugees rather as they do not recognize refugee status of
refugees, and there is a lack of official record of the number of unrecognized refugees
in GCC states (Khazaal, 2015). These unrecognized refugees are treated as guest
workers of GCC work-sponsorship program, as a result, they are vulnerable because
under the work-sponsorship program they “are not allowed to change jobs or exit the
country without their employer’s permission regardless of the working conditions or
treatment to which they are subjected” (Khazaal, 2015). Meanwhile, the refugees also
know that they are not going to receive any assistance from these countries for being
refugees, thus they prefer “embarking on a dangerous trip across the Mediterranean
to seek refuge, rather than traveling just 2,000 km to seek a work residency permit in
a country like Saudi Arabia” (Khazaal, 2015).
Implementing Border Control
Countries use border control as a tactic to restrict refugee to enter their soil.
In 2015 European countries started facing a refugee crisis, during that time
approximately 5000 refugees per day attempted to enter southern Europe
(Granados, Murphy, Schaul, & Faiola, 2016). The refugees were traveling through the
Balkan route. “The Balkan Route was practically the only channel enabling the two28

year migrant influx into Europe. Of the near-million refugees that reached Germany
in 2015, 800,000 of them passed through the Route” (CES, n.p). The route starts from
Turkey to either Greece or Bulgaria then Macedonia to Serbia then Hungary or Croatia
and after that Austria or Slovenia and then other European Countries as illustrated in
Figure 2.

Figure 2: Refugees Used the Balkan Route to Enter Europe (Granados, Murphy,
Schaul, & Faiola, 2016)

As the number of refugees grew, Hungary constructed a 109-mile fence with
bordering Croatia, resulted in a drop of refugees entering Hungary. As a consequence,
refugees shifted the route to Slovenia. Seeing the outcome, Slovenia built fences and
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so do Austria and Germany (Granados, Murphy, Schaul, & Faiola, 2016), which can be
seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Countries that Built Fence in Their Border to Restrict Refugee
Migration (CES, n.p)

However, asylum countries who share a border with home countries can also
limit refugee inflow by closing border. For instance, Turkey stated constructing a 900
kilometer/560-mile wall that it shares with Syria to limit Syrian refugees (Weise,
2016).
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INVOLVEMENT OF STATES TOWARDS REFUGEE PROTECTION
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, different theoretical
frameworks and arguments of refugee protection will be discussed. The second part
includes several factors that states consider while they involve in refugee protection
or to host refugees. The last part explores various factors states consider when they
want to restrict refugee migration in their territory.

The Importance of Involvement of States in Refugee Protection
Theoretical Framework
The idea, that protection of refugees is a global public good2, was first
introduced by Suhrke (Betts, 2009; Suhrke, 1998). Betts provided an extended
explanation of her remark. He observes refugee protection offers two non-excludable
benefits: international order and justice (Betts, 2009). He narrates that through
effective refugee protection refugees can be reintegrated in the nation-state system,
which prevents them from becoming stateless. When refugees integrate into the
nation-state system, it decreases the likelihood that they will become a source of

“A public good is a good that has the properties of non-excludability and nonrivalry. In other
words, once provided, the benefits conferred by the good (1) cannot be excluded from all the other
members of the community and (2) do not diminish or become scarce when enjoyed by another actor”
(Betts, 2009, p. 25).
2
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conflict or states’ insecurity. He notes that in the past lack of effective refugee
protection resulted in recruitment of refugees by terrorist organizations or guerrilla
movements (Betts, 2009, pp. 26, 27). He also denotes that refugee protection is a
source of international justice because when some states cannot ensure the basic
human rights of their citizens, other states take the responsibility. By ensuring
international order and justice, states assure global public benefit (Betts, 2009, pp.
26, 27).
However, the lack of a global government causes challenges, and like other
public goods, the concern is ‘free riders,’ as Suhrke explains “if one state admits
refugees, others will benefit from the greater international order that ensues
regardless of their own admissions. As a result, all will be tempted to cheat by letting
'the other' state do the job” (Suhrke, 1998, p. 400). As no one wants to share the
burden of refugees, but still wants to enjoy global peace and order, it creates a
collective action problem. She explains this through the Prisoner’s Dilemma3. She
argues that states would gain more if they work collectively than unilaterally to solve
the refugee problem, even though they think that unilateral action is more attainable
than collective action. Nevertheless, she believes collective action is possible as it
happens in many areas such as security and climate change (Suhrke, 1998). Like

Mainly derived from game theory, however, here it implies “in a two-actor model, each of
two states may prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD) yet one state may be even
better off when it can benefit from the unrequited cooperation of the other actor (DC). However,
being the state that behaves cooperatively without a reciprocal response (CD) is the least desirable
outcome. Consequently, the preference ordering of states is DC > CC > DD > CD. In a single
interaction, payoff through defection. Consequently, even though both states have a common interest
in achieving the CC outcome, acting individually, they will end up at the suboptimal DD outcome”
(Betts, 2009, p. 28)
3
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Suhrke’s idea, Kim Salomon (1991) analyzes that as states cannot act alone to solve
the refugee problem, so they created institutions through which they can address the
problem, for example, UNHCR. Thus, through multilateral cooperation among
international organizations and states, refugee problem can be resolved (Cronin,
2003, pp. 157-158).
Meanwhile, Bruce Cronin (2003) offers a new explanation. He argues that
refugee protection is a part of stabilizing nation-state system which would help to
create a coherent international order (Cronin, 2003, p. 158). This idea was developed
by observing situations of Post WWI and WWII refugee emergence and their
protections. He examines “the interwar regime reflected the belief in ethnicity and
nationality as the foundation of the nation-state, while the post-World War II system
was based on the rights of the individual and the protection of basic human rights”
(Cronin, 2003, p. 158); and as a result, “two contradictory principles in the creation
of new political orders: (1) the sovereign right of states to control their borders; (2)
the need to protect those forced to flee their countries in the wake of postwar statebuilding activities” (Cronin, 2003, p. 158). Thus, states involve in refugee protection
to create a stable nation-state system by “absorbing those [‘unaffiliated’] who did not
fit within this system” (Cronin, 2003, p. 158).

Factors that Encourage States to Host Refugees
When a refugee crisis occurs, a state has three choices: it can (1) stay behind
and do nothing towards the refugees, (2) show a positive response towards them or
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(3) respond negatively towards them (Jacobsen, 1996). When a state decides to host
refugees, it gets involved in refugee protection (Cronin, 2003). To explain the reasons
for this phenomenon, scholars take different approaches such as strategic interest,
international necessity and humanitarian issue (Cronin, 2003, p. 156; Betts, 2009).
Gil Loescher and John Scanlan (1986) argue that foreign policy objective is the
dominant factor towards the refugee policy of the US government. They examine
“foreign policy choices ordinarily have played the key role in determining which
refugees to be permitted to enter the United States” (p. xvii). They observe that, after
1945, domestic lobbyist groups, as well as humanitarian groups, have some impact
on the US refugee policy. However, their impacts are not as much as the foreign policy
group inside the government who “believe that refugees are not merely immigrants
and not merely victims, but are also valuable “assets” in an ongoing struggle with
Communism” (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, p. xvii). During Eisenhower, Kennedy,
Johnson and Ford administrations the USA admitted countless Hungarians, Cubans,
and Indochinese refugees as a part of the Cold War strategies; in contrast, during the
same period of time the US government denied countless Salvadorans and Haitians
who were fleeing persecution of the authoritarian regimes (Loescher & Scanlan,
1986, p. xvii). In another book the UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path, Loescher
(2001) points out that the Western governments, especially the US government, used
refugees from the Communist States and UNHCR as political tools to win the Cold War
ideological game. According to Loescher
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Recognizing persecution and identifying its perpetrators caused no headaches
and the grant of as asylum was generally used to reaffirm the failures of
communism and the benevolence of the West. The UNHCR proved valuable to
the West as an agency able to handle flows out of Eastern Europe for
resettlement in the ‘Free World’, particularly after the 1956 Hungarian
Uprising. International refugee policy not only saved many individuals who
were subject to repression in communist dictatorships, but it also clearly
served the geopolitical interests of the United States and its allies (Loescher,
2001).
While Loescher only shows the relationship between foreign policy and state’s
involvement in refugee protection, Alexander Betts (2009) suggests a broader
perspective on the issue of state’s interest in refugee protection in the book Protection
by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime. His main argument is
that when states have own interests such as security, foreign policy, migration, trade,
peacebuilding, and development, then they involve in refugee protection; conversely,
when they do not have their own interest, they do not participate in refugee
protection (pp. 19-20). He argues that “When states had wider interests in other issue
areas and perceived them to be connected to refugee protection, they were
sometimes persuaded to contribute to refugee protection beyond their territory”
(Betts, 2009, p. 20). In contrast “When these wider interests were absent or only
tenuously connected to the refugee issue, states rarely had a clear incentive to
voluntarily contribute to supporting refugee protection” (Betts, 2009, p. 20). For
example, security, migration, and trade are some of the areas that liked to the wider
interest of the North; these factors provide some incentives to the North to share
refugee burden in the South. He calls the idea as cross-issue persuasion (Betts, 2009,
p. 4).
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Meanwhile, Karen Jacobsen (1996) provides some different angles in this
issue. She examines “why some host governments respond in relatively generous
ways, while other governments act more restrictively” (p. 655) towards refugees. She
analyzes that as a host, developed countries and LDCs have different attitudes
towards refugees because of their different economic conditions which shape their
corresponding refugee policy (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 656). She identifies four factors that
influence LDC governments to determine to host refugees: “1) bureaucratic choices
made by the government; 2) international relations; 3) the absorption capacity of the
local host community; and 4) national security consideration” (Jacobsen, 1996, p.
660).
She discusses that the bureaucratic choices taken by a host government affect
refugees. To illustrate, if the refugees were to be tended by the Social Welfare Branch
of government, then the refugees would be better off. In contrast, if the army of the
host government were to take control of refugees, then they might not be in good
conditions. She elucidates this by an example: in 1975, Cambodian refugees in
Thailand were under Thai Defense Force, as a result, the refugees had very restricted
movement and faced inhuman condition inside the camp; whereas in 1980,
Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe were under the Social Welfare Department; as a
result, they lived in more humane conditions (Jacobsen, 1996). She addresses that
refugees can also be used as pawns of international politics. International pressure
such as negative publicity and need for aid assistance from the international
organizations influence host countries to take refugees. Sometimes, a host
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government can even use refugee policy as a tactic to embarrass or pressurize the
home government (Jacobsen, 1996).
Moreover, promises of resettlement in a third country also influence LDCs to
host refugees. Additionally, Jacobsen discusses the relationship between the host and
the home governments and how that relationship influences the host government’s
decision to take refugees. She describes this as “Haitian-Cuban Syndrome,” which
indicates that in the 1980s when the Cuban asylum seekers were coming to the USA,
the US government was taking them willingly even though many of them could not
show that they faced prosecution. But the US government provided asylum to those
Cubans due to the fact that the US government had an adverse relationship with the
communist regime of Cuba. On the other hand, asylum seekers from Haiti who faced
a similar situation had not given refugee status because the US government had a
friendly relationship with the Haitian government. A similar event happened between
Afghan and Iranian refugees in Pakistan, where Pakistan government treated Afghan
refugees better than the Iranian ones (Jacobsen, 1996). Additionally, Jacobsen
discusses local absorption capacity, a combined measure for “social, economic and
cultural factors which affect the local receiving communities’ response to refugees,”
that represents the extent of communities’ willingness and capability of
accommodating refugees (Jacobsen, 1996, p.666). She added that local economic
capacity, which includes employment situation, infrastructure, land availability and
land capacity, is one of the main factors that influence the governments from
developing countries to host refugees (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 667).
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Apart from different political science approaches, Egon F. Kunz (1981)
provides a sociological framework of hosting refugees. Kunz discusses home and
host-related factors that determine the refugees’ consideration of host states and host
attitudes towards refugees (Kunz, 1981). From his perspective, home-related factors
are “identification/ marginality: the majority identified, the events alienated, selfalienated; attitude to fight and homeland: respective fate-groups, purpose groups;
ideological-national orientation abroad: restoration activities, the passive hurt,
integration realists, eager assimilationists, revolutionary activities, founders of
utopias” (Kunz, 1981, p. 44). Home-related factors identify refugees, their types and
factors related to their identity.
On the other hand, host related factors are: “cultural compatibility: language,
values, traditions, religion, politics, food, and interpersonal relations; population
policies: augmentative and self-sufficient; social attitudes: monistic-assimilationist,
pluralistic- integrationist and sanctuary societies –tolerant” (Kunz, 1981, p. 47). Kunz
discusses that cultural compatibility is important for refugees as they can relate
themselves with host country’s society when they can communicate “and share their
values, traditions, lifestyle, religion, political views food habits, and they are able to
anticipate and evaluate their actions and responses, the integration will be
accelerated and eventual identification with the new country” (Kunz, 1981, p. 47). He
brings the example of how South Africans and Rhodesians were very comfortable in
Canada and Australia. Meanwhile, the population policy of the host countries is a
factor that influences refugee flows in those countries.
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Kunz points out that

underpopulated augmentative societies or countries would welcome refugees
because refugees contribute to the economic growth; whereas, overpopulated selfsufficient countries have fewer incentives to take a large number of refugees as they
are already self-sufficient. Lastly, he discusses social attitudes toward refugees that
influences refugee flows. According to Kunz, monistic (assimilationist) societies are
more hostile to the people from other societies, compared to the pluralistic
(integrationist) societies and sanctuary (tolerant) societies.

Factors that Discourage States to Host Refugees
Prejudice Against Refugees
To a refugee receiving society, refugees are symbols of instability, isolation,
and unknown (Vernant, 1953, p. 13). The identities of the refugees create cultural and
racial prejudice against refugees in a host country. Those prejudices work as
determinant factors for hosting governments because “tensions may also arise from
the consequences of admitting outsiders into traditional social structures” (Loescher,
1993, p. 8). As an example, Melander (1981) points out that Latin American and
African countries had admitted a considerable number of refugees from European
countries in the past; in contrast, European countries have paid little attention to the
refugee problem of those two continents. In other words, they have not admitted a
considerable number of refugees in Europe from Africa and Latin America due to fear
of racial and cultural prejudice (p. 37).
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In 2017, Trump administration imposed a travel ban on refugees from seven
predominantly Muslim majority countries, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia,
and Yemen, because the US government wanted to exclude “radical Islamic terrorists”
in the territory of the USA. In the same executive order, President Trump also
instructed to favor Christians refugees as well as refugees from other minority groups
over Muslim refugees (Shear & Cooper, 2017). Arguably because of the racial and
religious prejudice of the Trump administration towards the Muslim refugees, the
travel ban was imposed.
Researchers indicate that politicians can shape public opinion and prejudice
towards refugees. To illustrate, in Australia politicians have been using dehumanizing
and polarizing languages to isolate refugees and to shape public opinion (Blair &
Alam, 2018). Blair and Alam analyze that in Australia public opinion towards “asylum
seekers” is very different from “refugees” mainly because “political leaders typically
use the notion of genuineness to differentiate refugees from their supposedly nongenuine counterparts, asylum seekers travelling to Australia by boat” (Blair & Alam,
2018). Even though under the 1951 Refugee Convention in both situations all of them
are refugees, but Australian politicians call those refugees “queue jumping” asylum
seekers who are arriving there by boat and “genuine” refugees who are coming
through humanitarian entrants program (Blair & Alam, 2018). By doing so, they
shape public opinion towards refugees.
Prejudice towards refugees can also come from different parts of society, for
instance, Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) is an
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anti-Muslim support group, who invokes the anti-Muslim movement in Germany. As
a result, many refugees in Germany are facing racial attacks due to xenophobia (Perry,
2015). Hence, racial, cultural, religious and other prejudice invoke the public and
political opinion against refugees; and can impact a states’ decision to pursue refugee
protection.
Security Concern
Many governments consider refugees as a national threat. Usually, refugees
represent a minority group such as ethnic, religious, political and economic. Isolated
in a host society, they look for safety within the group of people who share a similar
identity (Loescher, 1993, p. 8). For many governments, this cluster of a minority
group is a concerning fact because they would increase the member of a minority
group and the group might “disrupt the precarious existing order of racial, religious,
and ethnic balance” (Loescher, 1993, p. 8). Governments also have a concern to host
refugees from neighboring countries because of the “fear of endangering political
relations, fear of encouraging a mass influx, or fear of admitting ideologically
incompatible groups of persons” (Loescher, 1993, p. 8). A similar concern was
articulated by Weiner (1996). He argues that if refugees arrive in a large number, they
can threaten “political regime, cultural identity, socio-economic order and
environment” in the local context (Suhrke, 1998, p. 401). They will create a national
threat if they have a military affliction with the conflict that they fled. He also claims
that in some cases, “one regime may deliberately expel people in order to destabilize
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its neighbours” (Suhrke, 1998, p. 401). In the time of globalization, the concern goes
beyond the national border. Utpala Rahman (2010) examines political, human,
economic, social and environmental security in Bangladesh regarding hosting
Rohingya refugees. She points out that Rohingya refugees are vulnerable and
desperate as a result they get involved with different militant groups such as the
Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization
(RSO), which are afflicted with Islamic militant groups. There had been few terrorist
incidents in which Bangladeshi security forces found connections with RSO. There are
more security threats such as illegal drug smuggling, and arms trade in the border
area (Rahman, 2010, pp. 235-238). Thus, host countries take the risk of security by
hosting refugees. Many governments would not like take that risk, and they might be
unwilling to host refugees because of their security concern.
To sum up this chapter and before moving to the next chapter, the whole
scenario of the literature review that discusses the factors that encourage and
discourages states to host refugees can be seen in Figure 4.
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National Interest

Decision to Host Refugees

Home-host Relationship
Foreign Policy
International Assistant

Yes

Cultural Compatibility
Local Economic Capacity
Distance

Population
Security Concern
No

Prejudice

Figure 4: All the Influential Factors that Encourage or Discourage a State to
Host Refugees (Model based on the Literature Review)

Scholars think that national interest, local economic capacity, international
assistant, foreign policy, home-host relationship, cultural compatibility, distance, and
population are the influential factors for the states to host refugees; whereas security
concern and prejudice are reasons when they hold back. Some of these factors have
physical attribute and measurable such as distance, population, economic capability,
and international assistant. On the other hand, national interest, home-host
relationship, foreign policy, security concern, and prejudice have non-physical
attributes and needs specific indicators to measure them.
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Based on the literature review presented in Chapter 3 and Figure 4, the
following assumption can be made.
Number of Refugees host by a State = function (National Interest, Economic
Capacity/economic ability, International Assistant, Foreign Policy, Host-Home
Relationship, Cultural Compatibility, Distance, Population Policy)
The equation implies that the number of refugees hosted by a state depends
on national interest, economic capacity, international assistant, foreign policy, homehost relationship, cultural compatibility, distance, and population policy of host
country. Meanwhile, national interest, foreign policy, and home-host relationship are
non-physical characteristics as well as they carry similar attributes and can be
interrelated. For example, if there is a good relationship between home-host
countries then the host country will be linear towards the home country because of
the national interest and foreign policy; and because of those of reasons bringing
refugees from that home country will be restricted. Similarly, cultural compatibility
is a non-physical characteristic and often depends upon the refugees rather than host
country because sometimes refugees take decision based on cultural compatibility
and in which the host state does not play any straight role (Kunz, 1981). In contrast,
international assistant such as donation is a physical attribute but most of the time
only important for the developing countries and not for the developed countries.
However, most of these variables such as international assistant and homehost relationship, do not have relevant data for each country for every year. Some of
these variables are complex to quantify such as cultural compatibility and national
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interest. Thus, only economic ability, distance, and population policy were considered
for this research because of the avaiability of data; and they have a significant impact
on the decision of hosting refugees. Besides, the main goal of this study is look at the
correlation between economic ability of host states and the number of refugees
hosted by states. Thus, the next chapter will be discussing economic ability.
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ECONOMIC ABILITY AND HOSTING REFUGEES
There is no definitive definition of economic ability in economics and political
science. Cambridge dictionary refers ‘ability’ as “the power or skill needed to do
something” (Dictionary, 2018). However, using ‘power’ in a definition can provide a
different meaning because there is an existing term ‘economic power’ which defined
as “the ability to control or influence the behavior of others through the deliberate
and politically motivated use of economic assets” (Frost, 2018). Therefore, economic
ability cannot be defined as “the economic power” to do something. In contrast,
Google dictionary interprets ‘ability’ as “possession of the means or skill to do
something” (Google, 2018). Consequently, ‘means’ has many synonyms such as
income, wealth, revenue and earnings, which will be a better fit for this research.
For this study, economic ability of states denotes the possession of means by
states, in this case ‘means’ refers to income, wealth, revenue and earnings of states.
There are no measures of economic ability but some of the possible indicators of
economic ability can be the wealth of a state, gross domestic product (GDP), gross
national income (GNI), and gross national product (GNP). All these suggested
indicators are interconnected because they demonstrate similar types of economic
conditions of states. To illustrate, GDP calculates all the monetary value of a nation’s
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income from gross domestic products; whereas GNI includes income collected from
overseas along with domestic income from the domestic product (Investopedia,
2018b). Meanwhile, GNP is equivalent to GNI as suggested by the World Bank, which
“uses terminology in line with the 1993 System of National Accounts and refers to
GNP as "Gross national income" or GNI” (WB, 2018a). GNI, GDP, and GNP not only
indicate the size of the economy of a country but also indicates how strong or weak a
country’s economy is because they represent the wellbeing of the economy and the
economic growth (Investopedia, 2018a). It is safe to say that the higher GDP, GNI, and
GNP of countries, the wealthy they are.
The economic ability has been identified as one of the biggest influencers of
the decision to host refugees, albeit not without some debate about the nature of the
influence. Researchers’ arguments are well illustrated here: “research on
international migration emphasizes economic conditions as the major determinant of
a receiving country’s migration policies. Some refugee policy analysts argue that
negative policy responses have coincided with periods of economic decline”
(Jacobsen, 1996, pp. 666-667). In other words, when the economic conditions of the
asylum countries are good, the probability that they will host more refugee will
increase. If this explanation is true, then it means that wealthy countries with more
economic ability would take more refugees than poorer countries who possess
relatively fewer resources. However, is that the case in reality? Several examples are
presented here that suggest the relationship between economic ability and the
number of refugees accepted by a states is not always the norm.
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As mentioned in the introduction of Chapter 1, 85% of the world’s refugees
are being hosted by the developing countries and the LDCs (UNHCR, 2017b).
Additionally, when we consider that Turkey, a UMI country, hosted the highest
number of refugees for the last four consecutive years, it is evident that even the rest
of the 15% of the world’s refugees are unevenly distributed among the more
developed countries. For example, let us consider the case of Japan. According to
Reuters, in the first half of 2017 Japan had accepted only three refugees even though
the country received 8,561 asylum applications and in 2016 Japan had accepted four
refugees among the 5,011 applicants (Reuters, 2017). Table 2 shows the number of
refugees that Japan recognized from 2006 to 2014 (LOC, 2016).
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Recognition
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of refugee
status
Resettled
refugees
Special stay

41

57

30

39

21

18

6

11

0

0

0

0

27

18

0

18

23

53

88

360

501

363

248

112

151

110

Table 2: Japan’s Refugee Intake 2006-2014 (LOC, 2016)

Meanwhile, Japan is a high-income, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) country. Its total wealth has increased by 12.7% from 1995
to 2014, Table 3. Additionally, Japan’s produced capital, including both natural
capital as well as net foreign assets, have also increased. On the contrary, its human
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capital has decreased by 7.6% as shown in Table 3 (Wealth Accounting, 2018).
Considering Japan’s increasing economic ability and the declining nature of human
capital, one may expect that the country would accommodate more refugees with
ease. However, Table 2 illustrates a trend of decrease in the number of refugees
hosted by Japan in the eight years between 2006-2014. The fact that in comparison
to the wealth of Japan, the number of refugees the country has hosted has been
disproportionately low, directly contradicts the logic that wealthy countries host
more refugees because of their economic ability.

Millions,
constant
2014 USD

1995

2000

2005

2010

2014

Percent
change
(1995
to
2014)

Total
wealth

64,533,910

68,732,334

65,573,815

68,123,308

72,710,058

12.7%

Produced
capital

13,219,784

16,075,017

18,365,178

20,928,169

22,791,802

72.4%

Natural
capital

428,703

411,578

409,974

468,037

475,645

10.9%

Human
capital

50,264,704

51,213,262

45,309,195

44,180,055

46,423,123

-7.6%

Net foreign
assets

620,718

1,032,478

1,489,468

2,547,046

3,019,487

386.5%

Population

125,439,000

126,843,000

127,773,000

128,070,000

127,131,800

1.3%

Table 3: Japan’s Wealth from 1995 to 2014 (Wealth Accounting, 2018)

In contrast, Bangladesh, only recently promoted to the developing country
bracket, has accepted a considerable number of refugees in the recent past. For
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example, the country accepted 932,204 refugees in the year 2017 (WB, 2018b; The
Refugee Project, 2018b). In total, Bangladesh was hosting 932,204 Rohingya refugees
by the end of 2017; whereas more affluent neighbors India and Thailand were hosting
18,089 and 99,982 Rohingya refugees respectively (The Refugee Project, 2018b).
Bangladesh has been the biggest host of Rohingya refugees, even though the country
lags behind India ($9.459 trillion) and Thailand ($1.234 trillion) in terms of economic
ability by quite a large margin, with a GDP of $687.1 billion (CIA, 2018; The Refugee
Project, 2018b). Added to that, Bangladesh has a land area of only 148,460 Sq. km
which is respectively 22.5 and 3.5 times smaller than India (3,287,263 sq km) and
Thailand (513,120 sq km) (CIA, 2018).
Another recent example of rich neighbors not hosting refugees is present in a
comparison between Saudi Arabia and Jordan. As seen in Figure 5, both countries are
neighbor of Iraq. Figure 5 also depicts the much larger land area of Saudi Arabia
compared to Jordan, and a larger shared border with Iraq. After the invasion of Iraq
in 2003, Jordan received more than 3 million Iraqi refugees whereas Saudi Arabia
accepted a meager number of Iraqi refugees (approximately 2500). Table 4 shows the
two countries’ acceptance of refugees on a year-by-year basis. Comparing the wealth
and the area of the two countries would present a similarly lop-sided scenario, albeit
in the opposite direction. Table 5 illustrates that Saudi Arabia is a much wealthier
country compared to Jordan, and the difference in wealth has been increasing in time
as well. In the last two decades, Saudi Arabia’s total wealth has increased by 145.9%,
compared to Jordan’s 73%.
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Figure 5: Middle East Region (Uzayr, 2015)

Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

Saudi Arabia
706
440
363
250
238
38
39
39
56
50
32
32
29
31

Jordan
965
889
754
500000
500000
500000
450000
450000
450000
63037
55509
29263
33256
33118

Table 4: Number of Iraqi Refugees Hosted by Saudi Arabia vs. Jordan (UNHCR, 2016)
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Millions,
constant
2014 USD
Total wealth
Saudi Arabia
Total wealth
Jordan

1995

2000

2005

6,441,927 6,770,907 8,928,385
211,322

230,977

228,575

2010

2014 Percent
change
(1995 to
2014)

12,824,357 15,840,744
354,322

365,516

145.9%
73.0%

Table 5: Total Wealth of Saudi Arabia vs. Jordan (Wealth Accounting, 2018)
The above examples show a trend of less developed countries carrying a larger
burden of refugees than more affluent neighbors. In 2004, UNHCR published a report
in which it analyzed the number of refugees in relation to GDP per capita. The
calculation showed that Pakistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Ethiopia,
Uganda, Islamic Republic of Iran, Zambia, Nepal, Guinea, and Sudan are the top ten
host of refugees in relation to their GDP per capita (See Figure 6). It also states: “as
can be expected, the refugee burden in industrialized countries in relation to their
GDP per capita is relatively small. The highest ranking industrialized country is
Germany occupying the 38th position, followed by the United States (49th) and the
United Kingdom (56th)” (UNHCR, 2004, p. 52). In some of the poorest countries
where GNP per capita is less than $170, such as Malawi, one in every ten persons is a
refugee (Loescher, 1993).
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Figure 6: Number of Refugees per 1 USD GDP per capita, 2000 -2004 (UNHCR,
2004, p.52)
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METHODOLOGY
In Chapter 3, based on the previous works, several factors behind a country’s
decision to host refugees are discussed. Additionally, Chapter 4 provides ample
indication that the relationship between economic ability of host states and the
number of refugees received by asylum states may not be positively correlated, unlike
the general expectation. As this study takes an inductive approach to investigate the
relationship between states’ economic ability and the number of refugees received by
states, for this purpose, the following null, and alternative hypotheses are adopted.

Hypotheses
H0: There is no relationship between the number of refugees hosted/
accepted/ received by host states and economic ability of host states.
H1: There is a negative relationship between the number of refugees
hosted/accepted/received by host states and economic ability of host states.
As per the hypotheses, the number of refugees hosted/accepted/received by
host states is the dependent variable; and the economic ability of host states is the
independent variable for this study.
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Dependent Variable
As previously stated, the dependent variable, for this study, is the total number
of refugees entering a host country. The definition of refugee is operationalized based
on the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees. The main reason to use UNHCR’s refugee definition is that UNHCR uses this
very protocol to identify refugee status; and also, this study uses UNHCR’s refugee
data to represent dependent variable. Thus, it is suitable to use the definition of
refugee provided in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.
The UNHCR’s refugee data4 contains more than 290,000 entries ranging from
1951 to 20165. The data is divided into five columns as presented in Table 6 (labels
in Row 1): Year, Country/ Territory of Asylum/Residence, Country of Origin, Population
Type, and Value. Country/ Territory of Asylum/Residence (column 2) refers to the host
countries that gave the refugees asylum or residence. The dataset includes 198
countries of asylum. Similarly, the Country of Origin (column 3) refers to all the
countries the refugees are from or refugee-sending countries. In the dataset, there are
222 countries of origins; but in many cases, the countries of origin of refugees are
unknown and denoted by “Various/Unknown.” Likewise, Population type (column 4)
has nine categories: Asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDP), persons in IDPlike situation, others of concern, returned IDPs, refugees (incl. refugee-like situations),

4

website.

UNHCR refugee data was downloaded from http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series

According to the UNHCR website “each row of data represents the information about
UNHCR's populations of concern for a given year and country of residence and/or origin. Data is
presented as a yearly time series across the page.” (UNHCR, UNHCR: Population Statistics , 2016).
5

55

returned refugees, persons in refugee-like situation and stateless persons. Lastly, Value
(column 5) indicates the number of refugees or other population types received by a
host country.
Year

Origin

Population type

Value

1951

Country / territory
of
asylum/residence
Australia

Various/Unknown

180000

1951

Austria

Various/Unknown

1965
1965

Rwanda
Rwanda

1993

Burundi
Dem. Rep. of the
Congo
Afghanistan

Refugees (incl.
refugee-like
situations)
Refugees (incl.
refugee-like
situations)
Returnees
Returnees

15000

1993

Angola

Angola

1993

Armenia

Armenia

1993

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan

1997
1997
1997
1997

Belarus
Czech Rep.
Afghanistan
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Cambodia
Afghanistan
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Belarus
Switzerland

Various/Unknown
Stateless
Afghanistan
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Cambodia
Iraq
Tajikistan
Bangladesh
Belarus
Switzerland

Internally
displaced persons
Internally
displaced persons
Internally
displaced persons
Internally
displaced persons
Others of concern
Others of concern
Returned IDPs
Returned IDPs
Returned IDPs
Asylum-seekers
Asylum-seekers
Stateless
Stateless
Stateless

37899
2
1
250000
10465
25

1997
2000
2000
2004
2004
2004

Afghanistan

Table 6: UNHCR’s Refugee Data Example (UNHCR, 2016)
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282000
4500
1300

88000
77000
778000
160000
3300
4000
58360

Meanwhile, the downloaded dataset from UNHCR contained information that
are not necessary for this study. Hence, the data has been pre-processed through
different steps before the actual analysis. First, this study is focusing on refugees only,
not on all the other population types; such as stateless or asylum seekers. As a result,
refugee (incl. refugee-like situation) is the only selected population type, and the rest
of the population types are removed. Second, in the Value column, there are many
values which indicate missing values by an asterisk (*) symbol 6, and those asterisk
symbol values are also removed. Third, the dataset contained entries from 1951 till
2016, whereas, data for independent variable starts from 1962. Thus, from 1951 to
1961 refugee data are incompatible for this research. Therefore, observations from
those years are removed from the dataset.
After these three steps of pre-processing, there are around 95,000 entries. Yet,
the dataset is not ready for analysis because most of the host countries have multiple
entries for each year as they received refugees from different origins each year. Since
every year many host countries received refugees from multiple origins, a new
variable is needed to represent a total number of refugees for each host country per
year. Therefore, a new variable, Total Refugees, is created which is the total number
of refugees a host country received per year; and the calculation is done by adding all
the values of the countries of origin for each host country each year. To illustrate, in
1996 Australia received refugees from 103 countries of origin and a total of 67,313

“In the 2016 data, figures between 1 and 4 have been replaced with an asterisk (*). These
represent situations where the figures are being kept confidential to protect the anonymity of
individuals. Such figures are not included in any totals.” (UNHCR, 2016).
6
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refugees. Hence, the Total number of refugees for Australia in 1996 is 67,313. Thus,
the Total Refugees represents the dependent variable: number of refugees a host
country hosted/accepted/received per year.

Independent Variable
The independent variable is the economic ability of host states, which has been
conceptualized in Chapter 4. As already discussed in Chapter 4, there is no direct way
to define or measure economic ability; rather, GDP and GNI/GNP are indicators of
economic ability. Thus, this study uses GNI per capita as the representative of
economic ability. GNI per capita is defined as “the sum of value added by all resident
producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of
output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property
income) from abroad. GNI per capita is gross national income divided by mid-year
population” (UNICEF, 2018). Since GNI data includes all the national and abroad
source of income of a country, it is a more accurate representation of economic ability
than GDP which does not include all sources of income of a country. Additionally, the
World Bank uses GNI data to classify countries into different categories such as highincome, UMI, LMI, and low-income countries (UN, 2012). The World Bank identifies
Countries with less than $1,035 GNI per capita are classified as lowincome countries, those with between $1,036 and $4,085 as lower middleincome countries, those with between $4,086 and $12,615 as upper middleincome countries, and those with incomes of more than $12,615 as highincome countries. GNI per capita in dollar terms is estimated using the World
Bank Atlas method (UN, 2012).
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The World Bank is the source of GNI per capita data7. The dataset contains GNI
per capita data from 1962 to 2016. However, many countries do not have GNI per
capita data from 1962. Moreover, some countries are missing GNI per capita data for
certain years but received refugees during those years. As a result, available GNI per
capita data was matched with available refugee data. For instance, Afghanistan’s GNI
per capita data from 1962 to 2003 is unavailable but received 149,792 refugees from
1990 to 2003. Since GNI per capita data for Afghanistan is not available from 1990 to
2003, all refugee data of Afghanistan from 1962 to 2003 are removed; and the
remaining refugee data from 2003 to 2016 and GNI per capita data are matched and
marged.

Control Variables
For this study, two control variables: weighted distance and population
density, are included. To illustrate, the initial relationship of this hypothesis is
between the number of refugees hosted by states and the economic ability of host
states, but the distance between home-host states, population and the land area of the
host states potentially might influence states’ decision to host refugees.
Weighted Distance
A general trend of refugee migration is that refugees tend to travel to nearby
states (WB, 2010). Thus, asylum states who share a border with home state relatively

GNI per capita data was downloaded from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD
7
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receive more refugees than asylum states who do not share any border. This trend is
addressed in the Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries: A Development
Challenge (2010) report. The report demonstrates that 75.19% of world’s refugees
are hosted by countries who share land or maritime border with the home countries
of refugee; whereas 24.81% of world’s refugees are hosted by the countries who do
not share any border with the country of origin of refugee (WB, 2010). Table 7
represents the trend.

Table 7: Breakdown of Number of Refugees in Host Countries by Border and NonBorder (WB, 2010, p. 3)
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Although the bordering countries generally received more refugees, some
exceptions can be seen in Table 7. For example, non-bordering OECD countries have
received 14.49% of refugee in contrast to bordering OECD countries are receiving
only 0.33%. However, it is difficult to incorporate border in this study due to some of
the concerning factors associated with it such as length of the borders, security in the
border line between home-host countries, fence or wall in the border, geographical
attributes of the border and quantifying the number of refugees hosted in relation to
the border sharing.
Even then, the distance between home and host countries usually have a great
impact on the decision of refugee-hosting by countries. One of Kunz’s (1981)
hypotheses is “distance of the native land from the country of asylum and the number
of countries the refugee has to cross in his flight to get there, act as selective factors”
(p. 51). In other words, distance between the asylum country and the home country
is one of the main factors for the number of refugees in host countries.
The distance data is obtained from the Center for Prospective Studies and
International Information (CEPII)8. The dataset contains bilateral distances in
kilometers for 225 countries (Mayer & Zignago, 2011a). The data calculates the
distance from the capital city of one country to capital cities of all the other countries
around the world as shown in the sample in Table 8 (Mayer & Zignago, 2011b, p. 10).
Table 8 shows the distance between Aruba to other countries such as Afghanistan,

Distance data was downloaded from
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6 and this study uses dist_cepii
bilateral simple distance measure data file (Mayer & Zignago, 2011b, p. 10)
8
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Angola, Anguilla, Albania, and others. To note, countries are denoted by their
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes.
Country 1

Country 2

Distance (kms)

ABW

AFG

13257.81

ABW

AGO

9516.913

ABW

AIA

983.2682

ABW

ALB

9091.742

ABW

ARE

12735.01

ABW

ARG

5396.22

Table 8: Sample Distance Data (Mayer & Zignago, 2011a).

However, bilateral distance data does not represent the distribution of
refugees in relation to distance, because most of the host countries often received
refugees from multiple home countries. As neither the distance nor the number of
refugees from each home country is the same, therefore weighted distance in relation
to the number of refugees was considered, which is an appropriate metric of the
distance parameter. The weighted distance is calculated by using the following
formulae.
𝐴 = 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝐵 = 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 1
𝐶 = 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 2
𝐷 = 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 3
(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴 𝑡𝑜 𝐵) × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐵 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴 = 𝑃
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(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴 𝑡𝑜 𝐶) × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐶 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴 = 𝑄
(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴 𝑡𝑜 𝐷) × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐷 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴 = 𝑅
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴 = 𝑍
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 =

𝑃+𝑄+𝑅
𝑍

Example Calculation:
Suppose, Belgium is a host country who received 10 refugees from
Afghanistan, 200 from Syria and 100 from Iraq in 2017. Moreover, the distance from
Belgium to Afghanistan is 5416.121, to Syria 3226.327 and to Iraq 3775.806.
𝐴 = 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑔𝑖𝑢𝑚 (𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)
𝐵 = 𝐴𝑓𝑔ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛 (𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 1)
𝐶 = 𝑆𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑎 (𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 2)
𝐷 = 𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞 (𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 3)

(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴 𝑡𝑜 𝐵) × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐵 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴
= 5416.121 × 10 = 54,161
(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴 𝑡𝑜 𝐶) × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐶 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴
= 3226.327 × 200 = 645,265
(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴 𝑡𝑜 𝐷) × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐷 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴
= 3775.806 × 100 = 377,580
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑔𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑖𝑛 2017 = 100 + 200 + 10 = 310
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𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑔𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑖𝑛 2017 =

541,612 + 645,265 + 37,758
= 3,474
310

Weighted distance balances the distribution of refugees and bilateral
distances, which cannot be done by using a simple sum of bilateral distances. In the
above example of Belgium, the total distance from the three countries will be 12,417
without the weighted distance, and this does not reflect the variation in the number
of refugees; but with the weighted distance, it is 3474, which reflects the number of
refugees as well as bilateral distance.
Population Density
Kunz (1981) theorizes that countries with high population usually receive
fewer number of refugees than countries that have a low population because highly
populated countries usually have restricted population policy (Kunz, 1981). On the
other hand, Jacobsen focuses on land availability and its impacts in hosting refugees.
Her opinion is that “heavily populated regions are unlikely to have the land to support
large numbers of newcomers; sparsely populated areas often have low populationcarrying capacity because of lack of water, poor soil, etc. Land availability also
decreases when the government appropriates it for refugee camps” (Jacobsen, 1996,
p. 667). Thus, two prominent scholars emphasize the importance of the host country’s
population and land availability, but separately they make less sense. For instance, a
country has 50 million people, but a small land area verses another country which
also has 50 million people but a larger land area. Therefore, a combinatiion of both
will serve a better representation. Population density represents both population and
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land availability of a country because population density “calculated as population
divided by total land area” (Countries by Population Density, 2015). Hence, the
second control variable is population density. The dataset is extracted from the World
Bank’s 9 website. The population density data is matched with refugee data, GNI per
capita data and weighted distance data.

Datasets
There are quite a few challenges with the dataset. The very first challenge is
refugees from “unknown/various” places. The problem is incorporating these
unknown origins of refugees with the weighted distance measurement. Since
weighted distance requires distance measurement between the host country and the
country of origin, it is impossible to measure weighted distance for the refugees who
are from unknown places. Hence, for the refugees who are from unknown places,
there is no distance or weighted distance data. However, from 1951 to 2016 around
84,033,330 refugees were from unknown places, which is a significant number;
similarly, between 1951 to 1961, 17,496,852 refugees were from unknown places
and from 1962 to 2016, a total of 66,536,478 refugees were from unknown places.
Without incorporating these refugees from unknown origin, the result would be
biased. Due to this complexity in data, two different datasets are created from the
UNHCR refugee data, World Bank GNI per capita data, weighted distance, and
population density data. Those two datasets are organized by using two processes as

Population density data was downloaded from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST?end=2016&start=2004 .
9
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shown in Figure 7. The first dataset maintains the simple data organization
procedures previously mentioned; after calculating Total Refugees, GNI per capita
data and population density data are matched based on year and country. On the
other hand, for the second dataset, all “unknown/various” data are removed. Then
the weighted distance and Total Refugees are calculated separately. Lastly, all the
three datasets- refugee data, weighted distance data, and population data, are
matched according to year and country.

Data Organization Process
First Dataset

Second Dataset

Step 1: Removed data from UNHCR refugee data
1. All population type except refugee (incl.
refugee- like situation)
2. All *
3. All data from 1951 to 1961

Step 1: Removed data from UNHCR refugee data
1. All population type except refugee (incl.
refugee- like situation)
2. All *
3. All data from 1951 to 1974
4. All "Unknown/Various"

Step 2
Created "Total Refugees" by calculating total
refugees per country per year

Step 2:
Calculated weighted istance by using UNHCR data
and bilateral distance data

Step 3
Matched refugee data, GNI per capita data and
population density data by year and country

Step 3:
Created "Total Refugees" by calculating total
refugees per country per year

Step 4:
Matched refugee data, GNI per capita data,
weighted diatnce data and population density
data by year and country

Figure 7: Data Organization Process of First Dataset and Second Dataset
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First Dataset
The first data set includes all the “unknown/various” origin but excludes
weighted distance, since contributions in weighted distance from unknown origin
will be 0. The first dataset has 5201 data points and covers 55 years from 1962 to
2016. A sample extract of the dataset can be seen in Table 9.
Year

Host Country

1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962

Austria
Burundi
Canada
Congo, (Kinshasa)
France
Greece
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Togo
United States of
America

Total

GNI Per
Capita
30000 1060
30000 70
12282 2340
223000 230
259740 1560
15700 630
14300 960
10000 1220
3000
1610
2000
500
26000 2310
5000
90
500000 3280

Population Density
86.34
112.68
2.05
7.08
87.88
65.54
172.99
349.69
9.96
62.07
18.43
29.65
20.37

Table 9: Sample Excerpt from the First Dataset without Weighted Distance

Second Dataset
Meanwhile, the second dataset excludes unknown variables and includes
weighted distance. Additionally, from 1951 to 1974 most of the refugees are from
unknown places thus all the data from 1951 to 1974 are excluded. The second dataset
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starts from 1975 to 2016. The second dataset has 3293 observations. A sample
extract of the second dataset is presented in Table 10.
Year

Host Country

Total

1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975

Algeria
Argentina
Cameroon
Congo (Brazzaville)
Gabon
Greece
Kenya
Lesotho
Morocco
Peru
Philippines
Rwanda
Senegal
Sudan
Thailand

20350
15060
30000
5000
60000
510
1850
190
390
600
690
7400
46000
91000
75760

GNI per
Capita
910
2700
350
480
2860
3480
250
230
540
1100
380
100
440
370
380

Population
Density
7.02
9.53
15.78
4.66
2.52
70.18
23.7
37.9
39.89
11.9
138.5
176.7
25.64
6.82
82.87

Weighted
Distance
2019.946
1098.113
301.903
556.9467
380.9314
136.4572
1754.562
405.7573
2272.929
2468.643
1750.016
180.006
364.4693
996.0536
536.6375

Table 10: Sample Excerpt from the Second Dataset with Weighted Distance

Method
Due to the nature of the data, with both cross-sectional and time series
properties, panel data analysis is appropriate in this study. According to Oscar
Torres-Reyna (2010) “Panel data (also known as longitudinal or cross-sectional timeseries data) is a dataset in which the behavior of entities is observed across time.
These entities could be states, companies, individuals, and countries” (Torres-Reyna,
2010).

This definition implies that panel data has two dimensions: 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 =

𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 = 𝑖 because of these dimensions panel data analysis is suitable.
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There are two types of panel data, balanced and unbalanced. Balanced panel
data indicates that data for all individuals available for all the time periods of the
dataset. In other words, “the number of time periods T is the same for all individuals
i” (Mayer M. , 2010); whereas unbalanced data implies that some of the data points
are missing, and those data points are not synchronized throughout the entire time
periods of the dataset (Torres-Reyna, 2010). An example of balanced and unbalanced
panel data is shown in Table 11. Both the first and the second datasets of this study
have a common characteristic that the number of time periods T is not the same for
all the countries i. This means that both datasets of this study have unbalanced panel
data.

Table 11: Example of Balanced and Unbalanced Panel Data (Mayer M. , 2010)

Meanwhile, there are a few ways panel data can be modeled, but for this study,
only two of them are relevant: fixed effects and random effects models (Frees, 2004).
To decide which model to use, statisticians recommend running the Hausman test. If
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the test yields a significant p-value of <0.05, then the fixed effect modeling approach
is more appropriate; otherwise, a random effect model is recommended. In this case,
the Hausman test resulted in a p-value of 0.6; therefore, the random effect model is
more appropriate for this study, according to the Hausman test (Torres-Reyna, 2010).
Summary statistics of the Hausman Test done in R is presented here:
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎: 𝑌 ~ 𝑋
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑞 = 1.4349, 𝑑𝑓 = 3, 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.6974
𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠: 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
However, in case, fixed effects model can control for time-invariant individual
differences (Frees, 2004), which is a necessary criterion considering the host
countries have undergone many changes unaccounted for in the independent
variables used in this study. With the empirical results suggesting a better choice to
be random effects model, and the characteristics of both datasets suggesting fixed
effects model, thus both types of models are analyzed and compared in this work.
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RESULT AND ANALYSIS
The data analysis is done with four panel data models: fixed and random
effects models for each of the first and second datasets. For all panel data models, year
and host country are the two units of analyses.

Results from Analysis of the First Dataset
As stated previously, in the first dataset dependent variable is the total
number of refugees; the independent variable is GNI per capita, and the control
variable is population density. The first dataset covers 178 countries, 55 years and
5201 observations. For both datasets, both fixed effects and random effects models
are stimulated in RStudio, and the coefficients of each variable are shown in Table 12,
(Please refer to Appendices III and IV for more detail).
Model type

GNI per capita

Population Density

Fixed Effects Model

-2.31446***

2.17239

Random Effects Model

-2.11621***

1.46610

Statistical Significance

Highly Significant

Not Significant

Table 12: Result of Fixed and Random Effects Models of the First Dataset (***:
p<0.001, **: 0.001<p<0.01, *: 0.01<p<0.05)
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For the fixed effects model, results demonstrate that there is a negative
relationship between the number of refugees received by countries and GNI per
capita of the countries. More specifically, the coefficient of GNI per capita indicates
that, with one unit increment of GNI per capita of a host country, the number of
refugees received by the host state decreases by 2.3 people on an average10
(Appendix III). Additionally, the correlation is highly statistically significant
(p<0.001). Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis is
accepted. In contrast, population density has a positive relationship with the
dependent variable, but the correlation is not statistically significant.
Similar to the fixed effects model, the result of the random effects model also
shows a negative correlation between GNI per capita and the number of refugees
hosted by states, with high statistical significance (p<0.001), and supports the
alternate hypothesis. The estimates of the coefficient of GNI per capita is also quite
close to the fixed effects model’s coefficient; and it implies that when GNI per capita
for countries increases by one unit across time and between countries, the number of
refugees received by a host state decreases by 2.1 people on average (Appendix IV).
Contrarily, population density is positively correlated with the dependent variable,
but the relationship is not statistically significant.
As a summary, analysis of the first dataset contradicts the accepted notion that
the decision to host refugees depends on the countries’ economic ability. Rather, both

All the interpretations for all the results of this study are adopted based on Torres-Reyna’s
lessons (Torres-Reyna, 2010)
10
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results indicate that countries show less inclination to take refugees as the GNI per
capita increases. Additionally, the population density do not show a negative
relationship that is statistically significant, raising doubts over the notion that less
densely populated countries take more refugees.

Results from Analysis of the Second Dataset
As opposed to the first dataset, the second dataset has an extra control
variable, weighted distance, along with all other elements of the first dataset. The
second dataset presents 145 countries, 42 years and 3293 observations (which is
1908 fewer observations from the first dataset). Both fixed and random effects
models were run in RStudio on this dataset, and the results are presented in Table 13,
(please also see Appendices V and VI for detailed results).
For the fixed effects model, the result again indicates a statistically significant
(p<0.05) negative correlation between GNI per capita and refugee intake by states.
The coefficient of GNI per capita indicates that on average with one unit increase in
GNI per capita, the number of refugees hosted by states decreases by around one
person (0.9). As a result, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternate hypothesis
is accepted. Similarly, a negative correlation is achieved for the weighted distance,
with high statistical significance (p<0.001). The correlation between population
density and the number of refugees is positive but statistically non-significant.
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GNI per capita

Population
Density

Weighted
Distance

Fixed Effects
Model

-0.9*

5.71

-11.18***

Random
Effects Model

-0.88*

4.1

-11.15***

Statistical
Significance

Significant

Not Significant

Highly Significant

Table 13: Result of Fixed and Random Effects Models of the Second Dataset (***:
p<0.001, **: 0.001<p<0.01, *: 0.01<p<0.05)

Just like the fixed effects model, the correlation between GNI per capita and
the number of refugees hosted by states is negative and statistically significant for the
random effects model of the second dataset (Appendix VI); based on the result the
null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis is accepted. The coefficient
of GNI per capita is also close to that of the fixed effects model, approximately 0.88.
Meanwhile, the coefficient indicates that across time and between countries, when
GNI per capita for countries increases by one unit the number of refugees hosted by
states decreases by around one person on an average. Also similar to the fixed effects
model, the number of refugees hosted by states is negatively correlated with
weighted distance and the relationship is statistically significant. In contrast, the
number of refugees hosted by states is positively correlated with population density,
and the relationship is not statistically significant.
In both cases, weighted distance shows a highly significant negative
correlation with the number of refugees hosted by states, which means that when
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distance increases by one unit (Km) per country the number of refugees hosted by a
state decreases by 11 people. This result implies that Kunz hypothesis is correct. It
also indicates that distance matters when choosing a destination by refugees.
Meanwhile, for both cases, population density is positively correlated and not
statistically significant.
One noticeable difference between the results of both datasets is that the
coefficient of GNI per capita of the second dataset is lower than GNI per capita of the
first dataset. One of the main reasons for this difference is that the second dataset
lacks 1908 observations since it excluded refugees from unknown origin.
Furthermore, weighted distance might have some impact on the GNI per capita
coefficient.
In summary, the second dataset supports the findings from the first dataset,
that increasing economic ability of host states does not warrant an increase in refugee
intake; rather, the converse is true. Additionally, results also indicate that the distance
between home and host states is an important factor in regulating the number of
refugees.

Discussions and Implications
For all four models, with the two datasets and two different model types, GNI
per capita shows a negative correlation with the number of refugees hosted by states.
In all cases, the relationship is found to be statistically significant. The result
contradicts the widely-held belief by showing that when countries get richer, they
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become less likely to host refugees. Meanwhile, there are few crucial questions
regarding the results that need to be addressed. First, what could be a possible reason
for this negative correlation? Second, many countries host a relatively large number
of refugees; and their GNI per capita would show positive correlations with the
number of refugees they host. How one may explain the negative correlation for all
countries in general, despite the positive correlation for some countries? Lastly, is the
finding generalizable?
To address the first question, in the last 55 years GNI per capita has mostly
been increasing for all the countries, so does the number of world refugees. The time
trend graph in Figure 8 is showing the differences of growth for both variables. Even
though the number of refugees has been increasing at an alarming rate, GNI per capita
for all the host countries have not increased in proportion to the number of refugees
they are capable of hosting, especially for the low-income countries. On the other
hand, high-income countries’ GNI per capita have been increasing, in most cases 20100 times more than low-income countries, but in comparison to low-income
countries, high- income countries hosted fewer refugees, which can be seen in Figure
9. The left side of the scatter plot, Figure 9, displays that most of the LMI and lowincome countries hosted a large number of refugees; in contrast, the middle and right
side of the plot is showing a low number of refugees hosted by the high-income
countries. The regression line in the scatter plot of GNI per capita and Total Refugees
in Figure 9 is also showing a declining status of refugee acceptance.
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Moreover, many high-income, as well as UMI countries, hosted more refugees
in the past, but over time their refugee intake has declined. For instance, in years
1970,1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010, Australia hosted 42,000, 304,000, 97,915, 60,246,
and 21,805 refugees respectively. Since this is not just one event rather a chain of
events across time, the negative correlation is an indicator of that.
To better understand the dynamics of the relationship, suppose in 2010 an
LMI host country had GNI per capita 1000$ for which it could host 100 refugees, but
it hosted 1000. Next year, its GNI per capita had increased to 1100 for which it could
host 110 refugees but then because of the increased number of world’s refugees, in
2011 the country had to host 1500 refugees. Similarly, suppose there is a high-income
host country, which had GNI per capita 10,000$ for which it could host 1000 refugees,
but it hosted only 200 refugees. Next year, its GNI per capita had increased to 11,000
for which it could host 1100 refugees, but then in 2011, that country hosted only 150
refugees. Thus, there are three differences; first, low and high GNI per capita, second
number of refugees they hosted, and third, the increase and decrease number of
refugees hosted by both countries. All these three differences GNI per are few of the
main reasons for the negative correlation.
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Figure 8: Time Trend Graph of GNI per capita and Total Number of Refugees hosted by States (1962-2016) (ExPanDaR R
package , 2018)
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Figure 9: Scatter Plot of GNI per capita and Total Number of Refugees hosted by States (ExPanDaR R package , 2018)
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Figure 10: Mean of Total Refugees (1962-2016) of All the Countries (ExPanDaR R package, 2018)
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Besides all those three reasons, there are many countries who hosted a low
number of refugees in the last 55 years as seen in Figure 10, which displays an
average number of refugees hosted by countries in the last 55 years. In Figure 10,
there are 55 countries whose mean of the total number of refugees hosted in the last
55 years are almost 0. Furthermore, a lot of these countries are high income; such as
South Korea, Brunei Darussalam, Palau, Bahamas, Iceland, Singapore, Bahrain, United
Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Uruguay, Slovenia, and Slovakia. There are also lowincome, LMI and UMI countries on the list.
Similarly, there are many countries whose mean of hosted refugees over 55
years are less than 50,000, 100,000 and 200,000. High income, UMI, LMI, and lowincome countries are also included on that list, which implies that countries do not
host refugees based on equality or equity and therefore, some countries end up with
hosting more refugees than others. Another point is high-income countries host
relatively low number of refugees, and because of that, it suppressed the other
scenarios.
Moving forward to the second question, positive correlation of countries who
hosted a high number of refugees, but not reflecting in the result. A bi-polar
correlation of countries, for each country one correlation from 1962 to 2016, Figure
11, shows the right-side countries have a positive correlation, and left side countries
have a negative correlation. There are 94 countries with a negative correlation and
78 countries with a positive correlation; therefore, suggesting why the negative
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correlation prevailed in the results and suppressed the positive correlation. Even
though many countries whose correlation is positive some of them are misleading
such as Qatar from 2004 to 2015 Qatar only received a Total of 820 refugees and it
was a gradual increase from 46 to 80 to 133; therefore, it shows a positive correlation.
In contrast, from 1979 to 2016 Pakistan received a total of 71,127,749 refugees, but
its correlation is negative because in recent years it received fewer refugees than the
past. Even though there are some glitches, overall it represents most of the countries
accurately.
Lastly, the question is how generalizable this result is? One of the limitations
of panel data is that it lacks generalizability for a population that was not considered
for the study (Valente, 2002, p. 93). However, this study has not used any sample
rather used the whole available population size as well as time periods. Thus, the
result itself is generalizable.
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Figure 11: Each Countries’ Bi-polar Correlation Plot of GNI per capita and Total Number of Refugees hosted by Countries
(Country names provided in the order of decreasing correlation, divided into positive and negative groups)
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CONCLUSION
This research starts with a concern regarding the growing number of refugees
in the world, and a shocking number of those refugees are hosted by the developing
regions or the Third World. The research question becomes what factors most often
explain states’ behavior towards refugees. Inspired by the works of academics and
scholars; examining the discrepancy in refugee hosting by the wealthy states such as
Japan and Saudi Arabia; and then applying inductive logic, the study draws the
hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between economic ability of host
states and the number of refugees hosted by states. By applying the panel data
analysis methods, the study examines that relationship.
There are many challenges while working with panel data especially the initial
datasets are scattered into four different sets and need to be organized in certain
ways to analyze. There are many missing values, and unbalanced panel data.
Moreover, refugees from unknown origin become problamatic for calculating
weighted distance. To solve the problem, the study creates two datasets; and applies
fixed effects and random effects models to analyze both datasets.
Meanwhile, results from four models show that the correlation between the
number of refugees hosted by states and GNI per capita of host states is negative and
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statistically significant. The result implies that most of the states’ host fewer refugees
when they get wealthier. Even though in general that is the trend, a deeper analysis
presents the reasons behind this correlation.
Meanwhile, the term refugee challenges the status quo of states. Refugees are
special types of foreigners as “they are neither inter-state relations nor center–
periphery, state– citizen or citizen–citizen relations” (Sicakkan, 2012, p. 359). In one
hand, states have the right to determine who can enter its territory and who cannot,
Peace of Augsburg of 1555, Westphalia Treaty of 1648, and the Wilsonian principles
of 1918 (Sicakkan, 2012). On the other hand, the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees and its related 1967 Protocol, insist that the state to do the other
way; “by granting refugee status to foreigners, a state abandons its right to decide on
their movements across its territory as well as its own discretion about how to treat
foreigners. The state is also obliged by the Geneva Convention to guarantee civil and
social rights to refugees” (Sicakkan, 2012, p. 359). Thus, in the asylum country
refugees are alien. They might, or they might not represent a nationality, but as soon
as they obtain a nationality, their refugee status would disappear (Vernant, 1953).
There is no doubt that geographically, the Third World or the developing
regions are the largest producers of refugees and migrants as well as asylum zone
(Malkki, 1995, p. 503). However, the North played a huge role in the creation of those
refugees in the Third World during and after the decolonization period. Thus, they
carry a moral duty to share the burden of the refugees in the South.
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States go through different calculation to host refugees such as economic
ability, security, national interest, local economic capacity, international assistant,
foreign policy, and home-host relationship. However, refugee protection is a global
public good; and it is an important factor to stabilize the nation-state system since
these people are vulnerable and can join terrorist groups and create instability. It is
also important to remember that some states are free riders and others are taking the
burden. Thus, it is high time to create a comprehensive law to define the role of states
who do not host refugee or host a small portion of refugee. It is also true that some
states are capable of hosting more refugees, high-income as well as UMI, and some
cases LMI; and some are not, especially low-income countries. Thus, the protection of
refugees has come mostly from high-income and UMI countries.

Scopes for Future Research
This study could not explore a few aspects such as national interest, foreign
policy, international assistance, and home-host relationship. All of these come under
one umbrella. Therefore, there is a chance for further study that can look at those
factors and how those affect refugee hosting. The second research could be on
cultural compatibilities such as language, religion, and ethnicity. How cultural
compatibilities impact in hosting refugees. There can also be a comparative study of
changing dynamics of refugee hosting during and after the Cold War era. For example,
how refugee hosting changes in two different time periods. Lastly, there can be
another research on the changing dynamics of the refugee problem such as distance
and social media. For instance, will distance matter anymore in the globalized world
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because refugee crisis in Europe showed that when refugees are well informed they
are willing to take the risk and go to Europe instead of living in the refugee camps in
Turkey or any other places.
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Appendix I: Developed Economies

Table Appendix I: Developed Country Classification, Source (UN, 2012, p. 145)
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Appendix II: Economies by Per Capita GNI

Table Appendix II: Country Classification by per capita GNI (UN, 2012, p. 145)
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Appendix III: First Dataset Fixed Effects Model
Summary

summary(fixed_within)
Call:
plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = plm_ref_data, model = "within")
Unbalanced Panel: n = 178, T = 1-55, N = 5201
Residuals:
Min.
-1085195.6

1st Qu.
-37580.2

Median
-5313.8

3rd Qu.
14077.0

Max.
3093981.5

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
XGNI_pc -2.31446
0.30653 -7.5505 5.121e-14 ***
XPopDen 2.17239
3.73605 0.5815
0.561
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Total Sum of Squares:
2.3466e+14
Residual Sum of Squares: 2.3201e+14
R-Squared:
0.01131
Adj. R-Squared: -0.023937
F-statistic: 28.7195 on 2 and 5021 DF, p-value: 3.9636e-13
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Appendix IV: First Dataset Random Effects Model
Summary
> summary(random_effects)
Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model
(Swamy-Arora's transformation)
Call:
plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = plm_ref_data, model = "random")
Unbalanced Panel: n = 178, T = 1-55, N = 5201
Effects:
var
std.dev share
idiosyncratic 4.621e+10 2.150e+05 0.653
individual
2.459e+10 1.568e+05 0.347
theta:
Min. 1st Qu. Median
Mean 3rd Qu.
0.1921 0.7449 0.7856 0.7671 0.8039
Residuals:
Min. 1st Qu.
-889500 -43429

Median
-22602

Max.
0.8182

Mean 3rd Qu.
Max.
1735
6950 3289251

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 90076.62433 12563.00562 7.1700 8.551e-13 ***
XGNI_pc
-2.11621
0.29491 -7.1757 8.206e-13 ***
XPopDen
1.46610
3.61502 0.4056
0.6851
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Total Sum of Squares:
2.4015e+14
Residual Sum of Squares: 2.3798e+14
R-Squared:
0.009124
Adj. R-Squared: 0.0087428
F-statistic: 23.6539 on 2 and 5198 DF, p-value: 5.9392e-11
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Appendix V: Second Dataset Fixed Effects Model
Summary
summary(fixed_within)
Oneway (individual) effect Within Model
Call:
plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = plm_ref_data, model = "within")
Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-42, N = 3293
Residuals:
Min. 1st Qu.
-1565511
-25700

Median
-4005

3rd Qu.
16470

Max.
2562371

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error
XGNI_pc
-0.95729
0.38648
XPopDen
5.71400
6.88434
Xweighted_distance -11.18175
2.15744
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01

t-value Pr(>|t|)
-2.4770
0.0133 *
0.8300
0.4066
-5.1829 2.323e-07 ***
‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Total Sum of Squares:
1.402e+14
Residual Sum of Squares: 1.381e+14
R-Squared:
0.014947
Adj. R-Squared: -0.031096
F-statistic: 15.9069 on 3 and 3145 DF, p-value: 2.8998e-10
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Appendix VI: Second Dataset Random Effects Model
Summary
summary(random_effects)
Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model
(Swamy-Arora's transformation)
Call:
plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = plm_ref_data, model = "ra
ndom")
Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-42, N = 3293
Effects:
var
std.dev share
idiosyncratic 4.391e+10 2.096e+05 0.472
individual
4.921e+10 2.218e+05 0.528
theta:
Min. 1st Qu. Median
Mean 3rd Qu.
0.3133 0.7981 0.8211 0.8126 0.8445
Residuals:
Min. 1st Qu.
-1227932
-36211

Median
-19207

Mean
604

Max.
0.8558

3rd Qu.
8597

Max.
2900006

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t-value P
r(>|t|)
(Intercept)
1.1763e+05 1.9670e+04 5.9802 2.
467e-09 ***
XGNI_pc
-8.8385e-01 3.7861e-01 -2.3345
0.01963 *
XPopDen
4.1767e+00 6.5968e+00 0.6331
0.52668
Xweighted_distance -1.1148e+01 2.1198e+00 -5.2589 1.
542e-07 ***
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’
0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Total Sum of Squares:
1.4627e+14
Residual Sum of Squares: 1.4417e+14
R-Squared:
0.01434
Adj. R-Squared: 0.013441
F-statistic: 15.9372 on 3 and 3289 DF, p-value: 2.754
4e-10
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